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MANAGERIALIZATION OF LOCAL POLITICS  
Willie Seal and Amanda Ball 
ABSTRACT 
The modernization of local government in unitary constitutions such as the UK has 
involved a complex mixture of managerialism and public engagement agendas. The 
post-1997 reforms have moved on from focusing on the delivery of individual local 
services such as education and social services, and, through comprehensive 
performance assessment, are now aimed at the transformation of local government 
itself. Since such policies appear to challenge the classic dichotomy between politics 
and administration, the paper applies Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems in order 
to analyze the relationship between these systems. The theory and policies are explored 
through a comparison between two large UK local authorities. The fieldwork suggests 
that nationally determined indicators and somewhat Weberian models of planning and 
control are prominent features New Labour modernization. Yet there are significant 
differences between the two authorities. In spite of the regulatory pressure, the one 
authority’s political system, sustained by a local media, longstanding municipal 
traditions and potentially explosive political conflicts, remained vigorous. The other 
authority, in contrast, was less able to resist managerialization. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The term the New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1995), has been used to describe 
the introduction of a variety of new practices and discourses in public sectors across the 
world in recent decades (Olson, et al, 1998). Essentially based on a ‘generic model of 
management with a neo-Taylorian character’ (Pollitt, 1993, 27), the NPM is sometimes 
seen as challenging bureaucracy (Osborne and Plastrik, 1997) and sometimes 
government, which may include both public administration and politics (Rhodes, 
1997).
1
 More recent policies of governmental modernization
2
 have been characterized 
by new regulatory approaches to both managerial and political structures. The policies 
aimed at reviving local democracy are arguably influenced by “Third Way” thinking 
(Giddens, 1998; 2001; Callinicos, 2001) and respond to a perception of crisis whereby 
the future survival of local government has been called into existence (Stoker, 2003).  
     A sense of crisis in local government certainly came over in many of the interviews 





 expressed it as follows:  
We need to rise to the challenge of being community leaders and really get to the heart of local 
government.  It’s not about the whole series of services…. It’s not just a collection of service providers.  
Anybody could run a care service or a library.  You could outsource the whole lot. We’re different 
because of the fundamental democratic structure, which is worth fighting for.  …Brand is hugely 
important.  People are turned off by party politics (especially us).  It just isn’t interesting.  
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     In contrast to this managerialist proposal that local government can save itself 
through brand-building, the Deputy Head of Education in the same authority put over a 
more traditional view on the demise of local democracy: 
… unless you give councils real powers, people will say why vote in the local election? It’s the 
government … I joined Southshire in 1988/9 we could raise all our taxes by the rates. They changed it 
straight away. We had the business rate … we had enough money in a good budget year. Unless you give 
people real powers ….. you’ll never get local democracy … not in my lifetime. We live in a unified 
media world. Every time an elderly person is on a trolley for more than 24 hours, a minister has to be 
accountable … ministers then create the powers for themselves to intervene … I can’t think what they 
can’t now intervene in. 
     These two views represent quite different attitudes on the relationship between 
management and politics. The first view implies that better management can help to 
restore legitimacy and support for local democracy. The second view suggests that 
political problems of popular disengagement require political, not managerial solutions. 
In the UK, at least, modernization policies seem to favor a managerialist panacea as 
regulators have moved on from focusing on the delivery of individual local services 
such as education and social services, and are now aimed at the transformation of local 
government itself. In the recently introduced Corporate Performance Assessment 
(CPA), the values of performance management are now being applied not to just to the 
technical delivery of services but to the corporate heart of local government (Audit 
Commission, 2002). Such policies challenge the classic dichotomy between politics and 
administration and prompt an analysis of the relationship between these two spheres.  
     To analyze the impact of these new regulatory approaches, this article builds on the 
work of Brans and Rossbach (1997) and others (Jessop, 1990; Teubner, 1993; Vincent-
Jones, 1999; Andersen, 2000) who have shown how Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic 
systems
5
 can be applied to the role of management in political systems. Autopoiesis 
offers a productive way of evaluating the perceived problems both of unreformed local 
government and the modernization policies that have been introduced to address these 
problems. While parts of the modernization agenda could be evaluated in its own terms 
of effective and efficient service delivery, these values cannot deal with the political 
revival project. With this deficiency in mind, autopoiesis offers a broader theoretical 
framework that enables the possible tensions between the objectives of improving 
service delivery and other espoused aims such as preservation/nurturing of local 
political vigor. Just as the New Public Management (NPM) threatened to hollow out the 
civil service and reduce the capability of the central state (Rhodes, 1994), more recent 
public sector modernization (which if anything has reinforced the NPM agenda) 
threatens to further erode the capacity of local government as a political system.  
     A political system not only involves communications about power (Luhmann, 1982; 
Jessop, 1990) but also communications about conflict and disagreement. Thus the 
substitution of a managerialist system where the goals are based on consultation rather 
than real choice (Midwinter, 2001) is denying the possibility of disagreements and 
denigrates role of debate. A modernized managerialist system assumes that goals have 
been agreed and that the main problem is a technical matter of measuring and assessing 
goal attainment (Townley, 2001). Performance indicators are implicitly used as a 
substitute for political debate. Political goals such as targets to limit school exclusions 
can be expressed in numerical terms and can be specified in an educational management 
contract. But there is no debate as to why school exclusions take place in the first place.  
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     The article presents further evidence from Southshire as well as empirical material 
from Eastmet
6
, a local authority that is subject to the same central regulatory pressures 
but which operates in a quite different geographical and cultural milieu. Crucially, the 
empirical material is interpreted through a theoretical framework in which systems do 
not coincide with people or even with formal organizational boundaries. The approach 
recognizes that actors in local government may have roles in both managerial and 
political systems. Furthermore, systems are not seen as designed but as self-
reproducing. Indeed, efforts to impose design through regulation and inspection may 
damage a system’s capacity to reproduce. 
     The article is structured as follows. After considering how autopoietic theory can be 
used to analyze the relationship between politics and management, the theory is applied 
for a critical evaluation of the local government modernization agenda. Then, the 
theoretical framework is applied to two large local authorities in England. The strengths 
and weaknesses of the new regulatory regime are discussed in the light of changing 
accountabilities, reporting regimes and, crucially, political reactions to regulatory 
pressures. Finally, autopoietic criteria are applied in order to assess the effects of new 
regulatory approaches on the vitality of the local polity.   
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT MODERNIZATION: AN AUTOPOIETIC 
PERSPECTIVE 
By 1999 the typical local polity in the UK had already been subjected to decades of 
reform and, although not ‘modernized’ in the New Labour sense, was a world of policy 
networks and agencies of fairly recent origin (Rhodes, 1994; 1997). In a post-NPM
7
 
context, a useful distinction may be made between local government, which is a 
democratically elected multi-purpose organization and local governance which is a set 
of processes 'associated with the blurring of boundaries between public and private 
sectors, the increasing interdependence of different organizations between one and 
another, and the increasing need for the government to be based not only upon authority 
and sanctions but also upon consensus and co-operation between a multiplicity of 
organizations' (Pratchett, 1999,  733). Although directed towards specific political 
entities such as local councils, the spirit of the post-1997 legislation was to modernize 
local governance rather than the more narrowly conceived local government (HMSO, 
1999). Thus the roles of the council in the local polity are to champion of local 
democracy, co-ordinate public policy-making and provide local public services 
(Pratchett, 1999). 
     Yet what is the nature of the organizations that make up the local polity and how do 
they relate to each other? This article visualizes the local polity as a set of self-
referential/autopoietic communication systems. According to Jessop, an autopoietic 
system 'defines its own boundaries relative to its environment, develops its own 
unifying operational code, implements its own programs, reproduces its own elements 
in a closed circuit, obeys its own laws of motion' (1990, 320). For example, local 
government service departments may start as consciously designed organizations but, 
over time, evolve their own rules and norms as a by-product of functional specialization 
and differentiation (Luhmann, 1995). While it seems plausible to visualize that units of 
local government service activities such as schools or refuse collection teams or even 
educational administrators may develop their own forms of self-organization and self-
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referentiality, it may seem harder to see the local authority itself as an autopoietic 
system. Yet, if the local authority is to be an effective champion local democracy and 
co-ordinate local public policy then these roles themselves imply the development of 
self-referential political and specialized administrative systems.    
Political and management systems 
In autopoiesis, the essence of a system is the way it deals with complexity as it 
‘selectively transforms problems it finds in its environment into internal –‘systemic’ – 
problems’ (Brans and Rossbach, 1997, 422). Individuals such as local government 
officers and elected members may have roles in all three sub-systems but they are part 
of the systems’ environments as social systems are distinct from ‘the personal 
conditions of its members’ (Brans and Rossbach, 1997,  421). Rejecting the traditional 
dichotomy between 'politics' and 'administration' (Wilson, 1987), autopoietic theory 
views politics as a social sub-system that integrates other sub-systems such as the 
‘economy’, ‘religion’ and ‘science’. Politics can only fulfill this integrating role if it has 
its own internal differentiation (for example, into ‘politically relevant public’, 
‘government’, and ‘party politics’) that is distinct from the other sub-systems (Brans 
and Rossbach, 1997).  
     Conflict between political and administrative rationalities may arise if, as sometimes 
comes over in the modernization rhetoric and auditor judgements, the political power 
struggle is regarded as a sign of decadence rather a necessary basis for collective 
decisions in the absence of stable criteria for evaluating values. As Brans and Rossbach 
explain, ‘...the political power struggle is not a sign of decadence, but an organizational 
mechanism for the consideration (and selection) of particular values in relation to other 
values' (1997, 429). Another NPM/modernization fallacy is that consumer 
responsiveness becomes confused with political accountability. In this fallacy, the 
reformers fail to recognize the significance of power in that 'consumer has no powers to 
hold a government agency to account' (Rhodes, 1994, 101). 
    As political systems consist of communications about power (Jessop, 1990), they are 
also about articulating and resolving conflict. Thus a key distinction between an NPM 
system and a political system is that managerialist communications assume that goals 
have already been agreed. In contrast, communications in a political system would be 
expected to reflect the possibility of disagreement, controversy and conflict. Goals have 
to constantly negotiated and debated through political communications. Political 
systems that lose these conflictual characteristics become more managerialist in 
character.                                                                                                                                                                                                            
The autopoietic characterization of politics is clearly consistent with conventional 
political analysis that predicts that democratic systems that do not reflect genuine 
conflict will begin to display negative symptoms such as voter apathy
8
 and/or direct 
action.  
The problem of the local welfare state: the consequences of prolonged incoherence 
Self-referential evolution anticipates that systems may become progressively detached 
from their original social purpose as a consequence of self-referential reproduction. In 
particular, defined by the characteristic of political inclusion and enabled by the power 
of law and money, the local welfare state generates the problem of a self-perpetuating 
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bureaucracy where the ‘success of welfare state policies is measured in terms of the 
bureaucratic offices dealing with welfare issues’ (Brans and Rossbach, 1997, 430).  
     Such self-perpetuating characteristics of local government are not confined to the 
UK. For example, stressing the plethora of laws, decrees, circulars and regulations that 
deluge local government, Mussari (1997) describes the Italian model of local 
government as bureaucratic-administrative rather than managerial. He argues that 
'(L)ocal governments have traditionally found the justification for their existence within 
themselves: embracing an illusion of "immortality," and engaging in a slow, but 
ascending process of disjunction from their social and economic contexts, becoming 
estranged from the administered  community and evolving into "quasi-closed" systems' 
(Mussari, 1997, 187).  
     In the UK, a White paper on local government modernization has argued that 'public 
services can be organized too much around the structure of providers rather than users' 
(DETR
9
, 1998, 11). In particular, the budgeting system, which, in Luhmann’s 
framework, may be seen as a manifestation of the medium of money, is input- rather 
than output-oriented. As a result, 'Ministers, departments and units have often been 
forced to devote much of their effort to maximizing their funding rather than 
considering what difference they can make in the form of actual results or outcomes' 
(DETR, 1998, 11). 
     In self-referential systems theory, a system's links with other systems is analyzed 
through different forms of coupling. The most radical form of system autonomy 
describes a situation of blind structural coupling in which systems have very little 
impact on each other's evolution (Jessop, 1990). Blind structural coupling may be 
illustrated by the ubiquitous tendencies towards incremental budgeting (Wildavsky, 
1975). Incrementalism may be put in the category of deficient system linkage since with 
budget changes having only marginal impacts on the size of particular service areas, 
there is no inherent challenge to the internal organization of the service or even a 
requirement that they consider the impact of their decisions on other systems.  
NPM and modernization: an autopoietic interpretation 
The managerialist strand of modernization is embodied in the requirement that UK local 
councils now have a duty to provide "Best Value". Best value means that councils must 
'deliver services to clear standards- covering both cost and quality - by the most 
effective, economic and efficient means available for local people' (DETR, 1998, ch.7, 
1). The democratic aspect of local government reform is associated with 'increased 
engagement with local people' (Martin, 1998, 5). Local people were invited to choose 
new forms of democratic representation that may involve directly elected mayors, a 
cabinet style of governance without a mayor or, thirdly, a mayor who is elected by other 
councillors. The avowed aim of the new local constitutions is to replace informal 
systems of decision taking and move away from 'an opaque system with the real action 
off-stage' (DETR, 1999a, Ch. 1). The reformers' case was that the traditional committee 
system was neither accountable nor able to deliver on the more managerialist agenda of 
efficiency and effectiveness. According to the reformers, UK local government 
perpetuated a service-centered status quo with little communication either across service 
areas or with the local community.  
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     If the earlier phases of post-1997 modernization followed a “twin track” approach 
that separated service delivery from democratic renewal, the latest policy
10
, 
comprehensive performance assessment (CPA), seems to be an attempt to combine the 
regulation and inspection procedures into a single regime with a single set of indicators. 
The CPA model extends the performance measurement and inspection regime from the 
service areas to the core functions of local government organization, whereby the 
corporate performance of the authority as a whole is given a ranking. 
     From an autopoietic perspective, a defining characteristic of the modernization 
project is that service areas apply less self-referential values or even, as is an explicit 
part of the Best Value policy, face the ultimate test of fundamental review which 
requires authorities to consider whether it should even be exercising a particular 
function. Perhaps the most dominant characteristic of NPM/modernization is the 
emphasis on targeting. Indeed, the binary code of the NPM could be viewed as 'on 
target/off target'. Overall, the NPM and more recent modernization policies may be seen 
as new types of regulation. Self-referential theory provides criteria for examining public 
policy as ‘it can reflect on the relationship between its regulatory instruments and the 
internal rationality of the regulatory field in question…' (Brans and Rossbach, 1997, 
433) 
   The danger of regulation is that the drive to integrate government will destroy the 
internal communication and core values of the various subsystems. In short, the 
regulation will breach structural coupling (Teubner, 1987; Broadbent and Laughlin, 
1997). In the language of self-reference, regulation of this type breaches the structural 
coupling of systems by destroying their autopoiesis or their capacity to self-reproduce.                                                                                                                   
Broadbent and Laughlin (1997) accept that the meaning of a loss of self-production may 
be difficult to define for social systems. Clues may be found in a system's language and 
norms. Thus if social autopoiesis stops when a system ceases to communicate with itself 
(Luhmann, 1986) then one way of recognizing the absence of internal communication is 
when a system can no longer describe its activities within its own terms or apply a 
distinctive binary code. For example, law is an autopoietic system as long it describes 
its activities in terms of its own legal/illegal binary (Deggau, 1988) rather than in terms 
of an alien language and norms based on economic efficiency.  
     Intuitive evocations of breaching structural coupling seem evident in the work of 
popular commentators such as Marr (2000). Citing Dickens famous schoolmaster, 
Thomas Gradgrind, Marr argues that, "(T)he danger of the audit culture is that it leaves 
too few other ways, too little room for inspiration" (2000, 28). Similarly, recent 
educational policy seems driven by responding to perceived employer needs rather than 
by a belief in education for its own sake. Indeed, from a self-referential perspective, 
some forms of non-financial performance measurement are actually more threatening 
than mere budget cuts because the PIs may clash with the internal norms of the frontline 
services. For example, a measure of student employability may be relevant from a wider 
public policy perspective but is not obviously a matter of core educational concern. 
     The response to the threat of breaching structural coupling may vary. In the context 
of education and health care sectors, Broadbent and Laughlin (1998) have focused on 
specialist work groups who provide leadership, reproduce core values of the 
organization and protect the wider work group from intrusion that interferes with the 
central work of teaching or treating the sick. Although calling these "absorbing groups", 
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Broadbent and Laughlin acknowledge that such groups may contribute to organizational 
colonization either through their inaction or even through adopting the regulators' values 
for themselves. Senior managers may identify their task not as absorption but as 
aligning the values of the organization with the values of external regulators irrespective 
of how much the regulators goals may themselves vary through time. In such cases, 
organizational self-reproduction may be observed through quite concrete phenomena 
such as patterns in appointment and promotion. Thus if, for example, academics who 
have successfully dealt with external inspection are promoted to become senior 
managers who, in turn, promote like-minded replacements, then the core values of the 
university are characterized by a strong commitment to meeting external regulatory 
demands. The downside of this model is that the organization does not have a set of 
autonomous values based on more fundamental commitment to research or education 
for its own sake. The organization may be said to be autopoietic in its ability to 
reproduce itself but "hollowed out" in terms of wider educational values.  
Strategic structural coupling, regulation and responsive governance  
The lack of accountability implicit in blind structural coupling and the dangers of 
breaching structural coupling mean that public regulators have to strike a balance 
between the extremes of tolerating blind structural coupling on the one hand and 
breaching structural coupling on the other. Calls have been made for strategic structural 
coupling (Jessop, 1990) or responsive regulation (Vincent-Jones, 1998). Jessop argues 
that '(R)egulation will work only where there is adequate understanding of the 
Eigendynamik of the system to be regulated so that measures taken will serve as system-
modifying perturbations rather than provoke disintegration or prove irrelevant' (1990,  
330).  
     The particular application of autopoietic theory to local government modernization 
suggests that there are three main traits to look out for: (1) values/defining 
differences/sources of identity (that is managerialistic values versus political values); (2) 
the reproduction of practices/routines; (3) the impact of regulation and relation between 
systems (structural coupling/blind structural coupling/breaching structural coupling). 
The essence of responsive regulation is based on a recognition of system differentiation 
and autonomy. Autonomous systems need not be totally unaccountable. Rather, 
responsive regulators, whether they are local government chief executives or central 
government ministers, should respect the core values of local systems and the 
limitations of their regulatory techniques.  
     The NPM agenda to make systems more accountable should be supplemented by the 
question: does the new regulation breach structural coupling? Is there a form of 
regulation that enhances accountability but preserves and draws on system self-
organization? The operationalization of the theory involves detailed analysis of action 
plans and their associated performance indicators. Questions concerning whether the 
plans are likely to change behavior are accompanied by questions about whether they 
threaten core values. Policy initiatives that aim to improve system coordination 
("joined-up government") are more likely to be congruent with responsive regulation 
than performance indicators that misrepresent a system's core activities.  
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT MODERNIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM EASTMET 
AND SOUTHSHIRE 
 
Constitutional and organizational changes 
The main services in provided by UK local government such as education, housing, and 
social services were until recently organized around specialist committees of elected 
members with their own staff of full time officials. The membership and leadership of 
these committees could be very stable and develop deep loyalties to their particular 
services. Even the most junior councillor had at least a nominal role in local government 
through participation in ‘their’ particular committees. In autopoietic terms, such 
structures were highly self-referential, making it difficult for local authorities to develop 
and implement corporate or community strategies that cut across departmental 
boundaries. 
     In Eastmet and Southshire, modernized structures have seen the introduction of small 
groups of elected members (or ‘cabinets’) holding individual portfolios. The portfolios 
did not reflect the old committee structures. For example, in Southshire, education and 
children’s social services were combined in a single Children’s Services Portfolio. The 
remaining members were placed on scrutiny committees. These new constitutional 
arrangements were very new and generated ambivalence amongst our interviewees. For 
example, the Deputy Head of Council at Eastmet argued that the constitutional changes 
were: 
Utter waste of time and money. …and I don’t see the separation of executive and scrutiny …[Yet, in 
the same interview]… what has helped with having a cabinet is that it does break up the silos  .. you 
automatically set that going native, advocating their own service … so it does break that down and make 
it easier to set priorities .. I feel like the chancellor of the exchequer … telling colleagues you can’t have 
the money … I do my budget speech … balancing … priorities ….. against the fact that people have to 
pay for it … they get bills on their mats … each council has invented its own set of portfolios. 
 
     A senior official with corporate strategy and monitoring responsibilities in Eastmet 
was (perhaps unsurprisingly) more enthusiastic about the new structures: 
A lot of members miss the old days ….. having portfolio folders is very helpful, especially when things 
are cross-cutting …. The broader picture is helpful. … (one-path) cabinet means the decision is quite 
obvious. 
 
     The new structures did not suppress local political debate for as the same official 
went on: 
 
.. for older people there’s a strong political commitment to increase services – but the area we’re under 
pressure is children services. For older people, the number of homes … it was a massive political fight … 
but in the press and community there was a backlash.  
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     These pork barrel types of debate are partly sustained by the persistence of aspects of 
traditional political structures that have survived modernization. In particular, members 
still represent local wards where they are exposed to the pressures of personal lobbying 
from constituents. The response from officials seemed to be that it is the members 
themselves who need ‘modernizing’. As a senior official in Eastmet put it: 
[There are] also issues around political process …… sometimes we’re still a bit old style …. Scrutiny is 
about commission of enquiry … we’re trying to change the culture of scrutiny. The members … are still 
at the neighbourhood politics level.  
 
     In Southshire, officials have adapted their language in deference to the clash between the political values of a Labour government 
and those of a Conservative local administration. As a senior official in education explained:  
We like to think that we know enough about the politics of this administration … and their openness to 
arguments about targeting the formula to areas of social deprivation… we’ve got to get money into areas 
where the lower performance is… Members in the past would have said this was developing a 
dependency culture.  Now we’d say it is to encourage self-reliance.  The government’s language wouldn’t 
work here.  We spent time developing a language that would work here.   
 
     Another senior education official in Southshire also talked about the difficulties of 
genuinely integrating education and children’s social services. As he put it: 
 It’s bringing together services from two different cultures … languages and the way they do things are 
different. They’re risk averse [referring to social services] … they travel in packs and take notes … 
things cost a fortune to investigate – that’s their labour intensive culture. Education is more seat of the 
pants – charge  and can-do … different professional backgrounds … the main problem is one is seen as  
taking over.  
 
     He was also concerned about a loss of expertise with the abolition of the old 
committee system: 
… now there’s only one person who understands education. Things go through rather more easily. Get 
your chair person
11
 on side, and you can do what you like … does anyone believe we have cabinet 
government (at central level) in this country? 
 
     Other officials although more upbeat about the new constitutional arrangements 
emphasized the variability in quality of scrutiny and the learning aspect. For example a 
change manager in Southshire argued that: 
There’s no doubt that we have a faster slicker decision process… the total reports to old committees … 
have been reduced by at least a third. From an officer perspective its much quicker … a bonus. The 
scrutiny process … depends on who’s chairing …. It can be engaging and interesting and can keep the 
executive on its toes. 
Members still haven’t learned to keep us to account as much as they can. 
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Best value and corporate performance assessment 
Rather than being seen as a regime imposed by central government modernizers, senior 
officials in both authorities stressed internal/local origins of Best Value (BV). For 
example, the Director of Performance and Resources in Southshire argued that ‘(T)he 
government never does anything because it’s a new idea… it tries to share and codify 
good practice…’ A change manager expressed similar views suggesting that ‘BV came 
along and we could piggy-back … we were going in that way … it was a kick … 
government embraced what local authorities were doing …’ Even the deputy director of 
education seemed receptive to best value principles and put it thus: 
Best value is just a name for things good management should be doing … it is how it should be .. or you 
just accumulate staff like topsy … before 1997 there was a fundamental review by council … the 
Conservatives thought we’d been living off reserves … it was a model for best value … why do we have 
an educational psychology service? .. and so on … 
 
     In Eastmet, the Performance Management Director argued: 
 
What’s helped drive this is the chief executive – he wanted a performance culture and accountability. Its 
you’re going to be a high performance performing authority, you need to know where you are … the 
inspection should be a reality check. 
 
     Some managers were critical of Best Value not because it caused any problems but 
rather because it actually had relatively little impact. For example, a change manager in 
Southshire County Council put it as follows: 
Best Value was always ok on high level reviews but it never addressed the culture of the organisations … 
the way we aid business. I’ve worked here a long time … I know the staff … the Best Value reviews had 
sensible findings … about service improvements. It didn’t look at process improvements – or weaknesses. 
 
     Similarly, an official in adult social services emphasized the primacy of inspection 
related to social services rather than those concerned with Best Value: 
There’s more corporation dialogue, more rhetoric …Best Value has hardly impinged on what we do as a 
service.  It is something that happens corporately.  Chief Officers and Members get very excited by it.   
We’ve had 2 or maybe 3 best value reviews that relate to Social Care.  There wasn’t a single £ sign in 
them, no references to money… sure, it’s about quality.  I really don’t think any of us have cracked it.  
It’s a hoop you have to jump through! 
The Social Services Inspectorate are interested in Community Plans and being joined-up, and 
understanding what’s happening strategically , …(B)ut the Social Services Inspectorate are far more 
interested in things like how well individual care files are maintained, how key workers are being  
allocated to children in need. 
 
Modernization and organizational routines 
Just as autopoiesis focuses on the self-production, the organizational change literature 
also argues that it is important to identify whether new practices are reproduced as 
organizational routines (Burns and Scapens, 2000; Laughlin, 1991). We can distinguish 
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routines at different levels. At corporate level, it may be enough to identify new 
reporting patterns. For example, the finance director in Eastmet explained how the 
corporate plan was operationalized through new reporting processes as follows: 
 The council’s corporate plan 2002-2005 has corporate priorities … we have clear goals, say, in relation 
to social care of vulnerable people. This is an internal working document where we look at goals and 
when they’re supposed to be delivered ……  there are regular (6 monthly) monitoring reports. They’ll 
need tweaking and tightening u  … We can look at any PI’s linked to this … pull them out separately in a 
bi-monthly report. We can look at the quarterly position. If they’re in the bottom quartile we can ask 
people to look at them. People can assess this on line – service managers can see how their service is 
performing. The CPA (comprehensive performance assessment) inspector said this is the best (reporting 
system) they’d seen.   
 
     In Southshire, the most recent emphasis was on pushing the impact of new 
monitoring systems down into the organization. A change manager explained this 
embedding activity as follows: 
Best Value was always ok on high level reviews but it never addressed the culture of the organisations … 
the way we did business…[The council’s programme] is based around customer feed back … 
children’s services … parents said restructured around clients groups.  
“Impact three” is about cultural change. It follows leadership programmes started 4 years ago. This is 
focussed on teams … working practices … plan/do methodology … a bit of Balanced Score Card. It’s a 
12 week programme … the aim is to support teams … empowerment … teaching people to be  
empowered …. Giving staff the confidence to do things but within the context of the service and the 
organisation … we do a bit of process mapping … it’s a whole programme … structured around what 
teams want to improve … thing that makes sense to them. 
 
     To summarize the evidence presented in this section, both Eastmet and Southshire 
showed signs of systemic change. Some of the change was clearly imposed by the New 
Labour modernization agenda. Other changes seemed to be more self-generated by key 
players within the authorities. The autopoietic framework whereby complexity is 
resolved through system differentiation offers a way of evaluating change systems 
maintain or lose their self-reproductive capacities through systemic interaction.  
 
LESSONS FOR REGULATION: BREACHED STRUCTURAL COUPLING 
VERSUS REFLEXIVE SELF-REGULATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Returning to our earlier theoretical discussion, autopoiesis raises the possibility of blind 
or breached structural coupling which are terms that describe quite opposed and 
generally unsatisfactory relations between self-referential systems. In blind structural 
coupling systems reproduce themselves satisfactorily but may or may not relate to wider 
social goals. In breached structural coupling, the regulation introduced to enforce 
adherence to social goals may damage the self-productive capacities of systems. In the 
specific context of local government regulation, the balance between blind and breached 
coupling may partly hinge on the choice and ownership of performance indicators.  
     Furthermore, the threat of managerialization may be based less on an explicit attempt 
to suppress political systems but more an unwillingness to accept that customer choice 
is not a substitute for real politics. Political systems are about conflict, shifting priorities 
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and even, the acknowledgement of limits of measurement. Thus tensions about 
pressures coming from central government and imposed indicators central interference 
are not managerialist threats. They are part of an ongoing struggle between central and 
local government. The more subtle problem may actually happen through local 
developments whereby local political systems are eroded by local managerial systems. 
Of course, the distinction between the central local tension and managerialist/political 
tension is complicated because national politics tend to support local managerialization. 
     The linkage between national politics and local managerialization is expressed in the 
leader of Southshire’s view on the role of members in the new cabinet system:  
 Its ‘professionalised’ … the councillors who run the council – we are full time substitute officers. Its 
much harder work… more technicalities… it rests on a much smaller group… we have to prepare [what 
the council approves]. We are more like officers than we ever were under the committee system … who 
wants to come along to scrutinise all the time? Members want to be involved in the decisions… some find 
it hard to come to terms with the division…. 
 
     The clash between local and national control could frustrate local officials, let alone 
local politicians. As we have already indicated, central interference is particularly strong 
on education. Eastmet’s finance director put it as follows: 
We’ve never had less freedom to set out own budget.  In Education there’s Ofsted12… a pack of 
rottweillers are after you if you haven’t spent the money on education.  We didn’t have an option on half 
our budget.   
 
     At the same time, the local budgeting process in Eastmet has resisted the 
managerialism inherent in the authority’s community planning process as the following 
account of the budgeting process in Eastmet illustrates: 
….each political group did its own budget with varying degrees of vigour.  All the groups did this.  I even 
had a bun with the Greens. We prepared three different budget papers which went to Executive 
Committee on the 13th.  The Telegraph and Argus [the local newspaper] did a box for each one and a 
bit of spin from each of the three leaders which meant there was some open public debate about the 
proposals.   
All three budgets were very similar, though the parties made a great deal of play on the differences.  But 
the same things were the areas for growth.  It was very successful but less successful was that you 
couldn’t take the politics out of it.  The leader said “you’re trying to take the politics out of it.”  It’s policy 
not street level politics... The idea is to have a 3 year horizon.  It was a bridge too far for the Members.  
They couldn’t hack it…Two political groups … they were all worrying about what the other party would 
say.  So we’ve only got a 1 year budget, purely down to the politics. 
 
     Although this last quotation shows tension between the managerialist aspirations of 
the official and the different priorities of the local politicians, the evidence does not 
suggest a collapse of the political system. Although it may not have the power to raise 
significant proportions of local revenue or diverge dramatically from national political 
agendas, the vitality of local politics as a communication system supported by a local 
media is quite striking. Local officials evince an understanding of the need to 
accommodate political aspirations. Such tolerance is less evident with respect to central 
government regulation as the example of education will demonstrate.  
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Breaching structural coupling: the hollowing out of local educational management 
The conflation between managerialism and centralization is most dramatic in education. 
The key legislation in both our authorities was not the most recent Acts on local 
government but the 1988 Education Act which gave extra powers to both the minister of 
education and to local head teachers. The local authority thus lost power upward to 
central government as well as facing a strengthened lobby of head teachers and school 
governors. More recent legislation had done nothing to reverse this change in the 
balance of power. Indeed, Eastmet saw its educational management compulsorily 
outsourced while the schools lobby was formalized in the recent establishment of a 
Schools forum. Self-management of schools has been accompanied by a huge switch in 
budget management. 
     The emergence of the schools lobby and the changed budgetary arrangements 
provoked these comments from the deputy head of education in Southshire: 
They (the schools) are very powerful. They have 88% of the money. We’ve got secondary schools with 
budgets at £2M or more … we are their servants, not their masters … it’s a bit more dynamic though, as 
we have statuary powers ….. they pretend they’re separate until they want money. 
Members know the lobby is important … for budgets … MP’s listen to schools … we use them ourselves 
… but they can go to elected members who will listen to them...In 1988 schools had 5% of the budget 
under their control … now we only have 12% … for things you don’t want to be responsible for, like 
transport. Education Finance has been through radical changes in the way that [the rest] hasn’t… 
 
     Even more disruptive for the development of Best Value policy is the type of central 
government intervention that may result from an unfavourable inspection in a particular 
service area. In Eastmet, the educational inspectorate produced a highly critical report 
on the authority's local education management. The report’s criticisms were based on 
putting evidence of low levels of educational achievement in the schools together with 
the tendency of the LEA to keep funds itself rather than distribute them to the schools. 
The report’s criticisms were supported by the local schools who argued that the LEA 
offered ineffective and poor quality services. As well as accusing the LEA of trying to 
preserve central services rather than of meeting the needs of schools, the report argued 
that the ‘council has a history of political decision-making that has reflected 
departmental interests, has been competitive rather than collaborative, and has 
significantly reduced the council’s ability to take coordinated action to tackle 
priorities.’
13
 Most damning of all it identified an apparent norm of the LEA that 
“Eastmet is different”.    In the inspectors view this norm was actually an excuse to 
accept low educational aspirations in the schools as being a inevitable by-product of 
deep seated economic, social deprivation and ethnic divisions.  
     With educational management to be provided by a public private partnership, the 
contractor was given a set of demanding (or ‘aspirational’) performance targets, which 
were based not only included the usual exam metrics but also involved the measurement 
of a range of social goals. With social inclusion and the achievement of ethnic 
minorities an important national priority of New Labour, the specification of the 
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contract ensured that schools would not be permitted to concentrate entirely on exam 
results. It was also acknowledged that there would be a difference between the targets 
that the schools proposed and those proposed by the LEA in its plan. As the plan put it: 
The difference between the school targets and those of the LEA reflects a school based approach which is 
cautious and reflects judgements based upon prior achievement and previous patterns of performance in 
national tests. The LEA targets are challenging and aspirational, being based upon the desire to transform 
standards, whilst closing the gap on national averages.14  
 
     When Best Value was owned by local government, policy priorities did seem to 
reflect the views of the local community. The main innovation of the policy was a 
concerted attempt to improve the linkages between the various agencies whilst 
respecting their self-referential characteristics. Although affected by national policies 
and standards, the performance indicators initially were developed and reviewed by the 
local authority itself. Such a benign verdict did not last as Best Value was not the only 
strand of NPM/modernization that impacted on the multitude of service areas in the 
local authority.  
     With respect to changes to educational management, it could be argued that both the 
style of intervention, the proposed solution of contractualization and the subsequent 
approach to educational management through national based standards shows many of 
the features of juridification (Teubner, 1987; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1997). Central 
government was attempting to achieve specific material objectives rather than develop 
and support the self-regulation of sub-systems. Regulatory intervention has not only 
breached structural coupling in the area of education, it has sent a clear message about 
the interpretation of performance in other service areas across the whole country. The 
verdict of the education inspection did lead to intense local political debate but local 
solutions were over-ruled by the direct intervention by central government ministers. 
 
From Best Value to Comprehensive Performance Assessment: An argument for 
reflexive regulation   
Under the modernization programme for UK local government, local engagement does 
not just depend on traditional political forms of accountability since the attainment of 
Best Value is informed at all stages by a commitment to alternative forms of surveying 
local opinion beyond the occasional foray to the ballot box. Thus the “performance 
management framework” of Best Value is itself based on local consultation and checks 
based on user-evaluations. The framework is composed of a performance plan, an 
agreed program of performance reviews, the setting of targets for improved 
performance, an independent audit of the service reviews and performance targets.  
     The performance framework for Best Value involves a hierarchy of indicators. At the 
apex of the pyramid there are a small number of nationally standardized 'general health' 
indicators that 'reflect the underlying capacity and performance of local authorities as 
both democratic institutions and bodies responsible for managing a significant share of 
public expenditure' (DETR, 1998, ch.7, 5). The government also sets 'key indicators 
reflecting the effectiveness and quality of local services' (1998, ch.7, 5). Thus both the 
managerialist and the democratic vitality aspects of the reform program are monitored. 
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     The gradual evolution of Best Value policy into a reflexive form of self-regulation 
(Vincent-Jones, 1997; Black, 1996) may be derailed by inspection regimes in other 
areas that operate with different cycles of inspection. These regimes may also apply 
different value systems with potentially greater significance for the specialist service 
managers. Thus while managers in the corporate core are concerned with the task of 
applying best value principles to strategic issues, particular services may see best value 




     The more recent CPA regime is designed to offer authorities ‘earned autonomy’, that 
is, an autonomy granted on basis that local government has developed its own 
managerialist norms and on the basis that local government units are goal congruent 
with head office. In short, autonomy is given when local governments can be relied 
upon to deliver central determined targets! In the specific case of Eastmet the auditors 
revealed their attitude to local politics through the following verdict:  
Councillors and officers describe a real willingness to put party politics aside to make 
progress on issues that will bring benefits to Eastmet citizens, as set out in the 2020 Vision.  
  
     The impression given by this sort of statement seems to be that local politics may be 
tolerated as long as it does not get in the way of central planning and managerialist 
systems of monitoring and control. There is an implicit assumption that collective 
preferences are stable and have been effectively expressed through the new mechanisms 
of citizen consultation rather than through the implicitly unstable processes of party 
politics. 
     From a managerialist perspective
16
, Eastmet seemed to be both more responsive as 
well as potentially able to move resources around to meet strategic aims. The new 
performance management framework had linked the disparate systems of local 
government with each other as well as to central government and to local 
consumer/citizens. Indeed, such potential strategic capacity was officially recognized by 
the CPA assessment. However, a more critical interpretation of events suggest that the 
problems of hollowing out especially through the abolition of the education committee 
and the outsourcing of educational management has eroded both accountability and 
collective capacity (Rhodes, 1994). The new cabinet system cannot possibly achieve the 
same levels of collective accountability that were potentially available in the old 
committee system. Although the introduction of self-managed budgets, has given the 
schools more autonomy (and thus the potentially more self-referentiality), the evidence 
from Eastmet is that not only have national criteria of performance been imposed but 
the schools’ own targets have been superceded by levels determined by the contractor.    
     The question of target-setting prompts other questions about the measurement and 
inspection system. For example, is there a difference between local and centrally 
prescribed performance indicators? Second, to what extent are the performance 
indicators based on a "we measure what they can and we get what they measure" 
dilemma? Although it is difficult to generalize about the diversity of performance 
indicators proposed in the Department of the Environment/Audit Commission 
guidelines (DETR, 1999b) the initial impression is that there does seem to be a strong 
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element of "measuring what you can" or least "use data that you already have". Some 
strategic objectives seem to be a product of recent public debates. For example, the 
strategic objectives for social services focus on the stability of placements of children 
looked in care together with their educational attainment. PIs for the police draw heavily 
on the British Crime survey undertaken by the Home office.  
Evidence of responsive regulation/strategic structural coupling 
Local officials involved with Best Value in the corporate core argued that the ultimate 
success of the performance management framework depends on whether managers 
adopt a continuous improvement philosophy. The philosophy for developing 
performance indicators in Eastmet was to focus on user perception on what constitutes 
an improvement in service. Although this focus on measures based on user perception 
conformed to central government/Audit Commission thinking, the problem with such a 
philosophy is that it does not leave any scope for the professional values that constitute 
the core values of the system. For example, as educational users, students may all aspire 
to good exam results. An undue focus on this outcome may conflict with the ethos of 
educational professionals who would probably have a more abstract concept of 
educational standards. 
     These arguments suggest that responsive local governance requires either for some 
resistance to performance indicators and/or a management style that absorbs some of 
their impact. Although during earlier interviews there seems little sign of resistance, the 
authority did seem to have a deeper understanding of recent business philosophy and 
rhetoric than central government. In an attempt to avoid the league table mentality 
espoused by central government, the authority aimed to promote a shift towards a non-
blame culture. Such a culture involves a willingness to make mistakes plus an attitude to 
performance indicators whereby they may simply point to apparent good performers. 
The approach is not to indicate success or failure but discover "who to talk to" as a first 
step to improving performance. Similarly, the philosophy of benchmarking is to 
understand processes and not simply to be members of clubs that focus purely on 
numbers.  
     The new CPA regime does seem to accept some of the arguments for responsive 
regulation especially through an implicit recognition of past regulatory excesses. 
Against these encouraging changes there remains a suspicion of party politics, of debate 
and of conflict. The regime reveals an urge to control along the lines of Weber's 'end-
means' model and 'command and control' model (Brans and Rossbach, 1997). Against 
this regulatory threat to the vitality of the local political system, Eastmet has a strong 
geographically-based sense of local identity, a vibrant local media, and a heritage of 
magnificent buildings that reflected the proud municipal traditions of the city. There 
were still strong distinctions in the codes operating in the different sub-systems of the 
political system. The same policies were talked about in different ways in different 
systems. For example, the deputy head of the council attributed the start of a policy to 
the election of his party while the officials talked about the impact of central 
government regulation. Individuals were separate from the systems within which they 
operated (Brans and Rossbach, 1997) in the sense that could change their modes of 
operation according to the codes of the particular political sub-system. For example, 
when the council was hung with a period of minority control, the finance director 
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helped each party to formulate their own budget proposals even though he knew that, 
from a technical perspective, the room for any significant changes were very limited. 
     In an autopoietic system, contradiction and conflict are not necessarily a source of 
weakness. An autopoietic social system ends when, as a communicative system, it 
ceases to communicate. It stops if communication has not been understood or if 
communication has been rejected. Survival as an autopoietic system requires that it 
develop reflexive communication so that it can return to itself and communicate its own 
difficulties. In an autopoietic system, contradiction, conflict and controversy operate as 
a sort of immune system in that they can open up new modes of communication 
(Luhmann, 1986).  
     The importance of conflict and contradiction are even more important for the 
survival of the political system since it exists to resolve conflict. In Eastmet, the 
established political parties seemed to recognize a responsibility to avoid exacerbating 
conflicts that could lead to the rise of more extremist parties. In these important 
respects, it is submitted that the managerialism of the modernization agenda is more of 
threat in county authorities with confused allegiances between town and country, a lack 
of geographical identity and an absence of specifically “political” problems. 
     
CONCLUSION 
The strength of the autopoietic approach is that can offer a consistent framework for 
analyzing both the problems and the proposed solutions of the expanded welfare state 
that UK local government is charged to administer. From an autopoietic perspective, 
while system differentiation is a response to complexity, the resulting self-referentiality 
can lead to self-serving and lack of accountability. Yet paradoxically, the regulatory 
reforms aimed at increasing accountability may run the risk of destroying the self-
reproductive processes that services such as education and personal social services must 
ultimately rely on.  
     Autopoietic theory suggests that user satisfaction techniques are not a substitute as 
for real politics. Defined through an autopoietic theoretical lens, responsive governance 
is concerned to preserve core values in sub-systems. Although the identification of core 
values may be hampered by empirical ambiguities, resistance that is articulated around 
such a defense should be recognized as a legitimate input to the policy debate and not 
automatically interpreted as special pleading by self-interested professionals. User-
satisfaction surveys may be used as a weapon against special pleading but they may also 
erode core values. National educational policy has become defined in managerialist 
terms with material objectives measured by PIs of educational attainment. Not only is 
the preservation or even enhancement of local participation excluded from these 
educational indicators but managerialist mechanisms deny that there may be room for 
political disagreements and debate.  
     By enabling an analysis of the relationship between systems, autopoietic theory is an 
effective tool for revealing potential trends in the managerialism of politics. In this 
respect, the article has gone beyond the relatively well-researched service areas such as 
education to consider the impact of target-driven regulation on the vitality of the local 
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political system itself. While the episodes from the case study did suggest that 
nationally determined indicators and somewhat Weberian models of planning and 
control are prominent features New Labour modernization, Eastmet’s political system 
was sustained by a local media, long standing municipal traditions and potentially 
explosive political conflicts, and, thus, remained defiantly vigorous. More work would 
seem to be desirable to assess whether authorities operating without a naturally strong 
sense of locality exhibit greater evidence for the managerialization of their political 
systems.  
Willie Seal is Professor, Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, 




                                                 
1
 Versions of this paper have been presented to the European Network for change in 
management accounting in Oslo and in Siena at a workshop on Corporate Governance 
and New Public Management.  We would like to thank participants, especially Angelo 
Riccaboni, for comments and encouragement. 
2
 For some recent interpretations of New Labour modernization and ‘modern 
management’ see Townley (2001) and Midwinter (2001). 
3
 We did not ask this person about her political philosophy. However, British 
Conservatives are not usually keen on the “Third Way”! 
4
 Southshire is an assumed name. 
5
 See Brans and Rossbach (1997) for an extensive review of Luhmann’s work on public 
administration. Useful examples of English versions include Luhmann (1986; 1995). 
6
 Eastmet is also an assumed name. 
7
 ‘Post-NPM’ implies that such policies have had an impact not that they have 
necessarily ceased to apply! 
8
 Ironically, concern about low voter turn out in local elections has led to electoral 
participation becoming a managerialist target!  
9
 Department of Environment, Transport and Regions which later became the 
Department of Local Government, Transport and Regions. 
10
 Recent policy thinking is set out in the White Paper,  Strong Local Leadership – 
Quality Public Services. 
(DLTR, 2001). 
11
 Name withheld. 
12
 The educational inspectorate of central government. 
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13
 This quotation cannot be properly referenced without revealing the identity of the 
authority. 
14
 See footnote 8. 
15
 One manager in the Youth Offending Team (YOT) described his working life in the 
YOT being his "day job" with Best Value regarded as the "night job".  
16
 Both local and national press have been critical of the possibility for secret cabinet 
meetings involving a few councillors. One unresolved issue is the role of the more 
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